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Abstract
We study the competitive equilibrium of large random economies with linear activities using methods
of statistical mechanics. We focus on economies with C commodities, N firms, each running a randomly
drawn linear technology, and one consumer. We derive, in the limit N,C → ∞ with n = N/C fixed, a
complete description of the statistical properties of typical equilibria. We find two regimes, which in the
limit of efficient technologies are separated by a phase transition, and argue that endogenous technological
change drives the economy close to the critical point.
1 Introduction
The aggregation of microeconomic behavior into macroeconomic laws is a difficult task because of the pres-
ence of heterogeneity both at the level of individual characteristics and of interactions. The paradigm of the
representative agent, which essentially reduces the problem to that of a single macro individual, has shown
all its inadequacy [1], calling for alternative approaches. Computational methods – both in the spirit of agent
based modeling or implementing general equilibrium theory – represent a viable substitute, rapidly growing in
popularity. However these techniques provide punctual results which are difficult to generalize. While they are
very useful in deriving specific results for a specific economy, they do not lead to a broad understanding.
At the other extreme, the methods of mathematical economics aim at general results – such as existence,
uniqueness, efficiency – which hold for broad classes of situations. Pinning down the typical macroeconomic
behavior beyond these general results is however very hard, especially when agents are heterogeneous (e.g. in
their endowments, technologies, budgets, utility functions, . . . ) and are interconnected via a complex network
of interactions.
Understanding the complex macro-behavior of a system does not necessarily require a detailed description
of it in all its complications. Indeed many laws which govern macro-behavior have a statistical origin. E.P.
Wigner [2] first had the intuition that in such cases, the collective behavior of a large system with N degrees
of freedom – heavy atoms in his case – is well approximated by that of a system with random interactions in
the limit N →∞. Indeed, if the relevant properties obey laws of large numbers, then they will be substantially
independent of the specific realization of the interactions when N is large.
The statistical properties of random systems have been a central research issue in statistical mechanics for
the past two decades, and extremely powerful analytical tools to calculate them have been developed. These
techniques have already found a wide range of applications outside physics: among others, in combinatorial
optimization problems and computer science, in the theory of neural networks, in information theory, and in
agent based models [3–7].
It has been realized several times by different authors [8,9] that tools developed in statistical mechanics can
be useful in economic theory. While the idea of studying large random economies as a proxy for a complex
economy with heterogeneous agents may not be entirely new (see e.g. [10]), modern tools of statistical mechanics
of disordered systems have not yet been exploited. Here we apply these tools to the study of the typical properties
of large random production economies. The model we shall consider, outlined in detail in the next section, is
based on a C dimensional commodity space and has N firms with linear technologies, as in [11]. Feasible
technologies are assumed to be drawn at random from some probability distribution. Firms chose technologies
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from the set of feasible ones and fix the scale of operations so as to maximize their respective profits. The total
supply is matched to the demand of a single consumer with initial endowments drawn at random from a given
distribution. Equilibrium prices, operation scales and consumption levels are determined by imposing that all
markets clear. Equilibrium quantities are random, as they depend on the draw of technologies and o initial
endowments. A complete statistical characterization of an ensemble of equilibria of large random economies is
obtained in the limits N → ∞ and C → ∞ . The laws we derive are of a statistical nature, i.e. laws that a
typical realization of an economy from the ensemble will satisfy almost surely, i.e. with a probability close to
one when N is large.
We show in particular that this approach: i) identifies the relevant macroscopic variables, the so-called order
parameters, describing the behavior of the system in the limit N →∞; ii) allows the calculation of the values of
the order parameters from the solution of a “representative” firm problem, which embodies all the complexity
of the full heterogeneous model; iii) enables one to derive distributions of consumption levels and of scales
of activities at equilibrium. We will prove that for a broad class of choices the properties of the competitive
equilibria change qualitatively at a critical value nc = 2 of the ratio n = N/C. This change becomes a sharp
phase transition in the limiting case of efficient technologies. Loosely speaking, the economy expands rapidly
when n increases for n < 2 whereas, when n > nc the economy is in a mature phase where the technology space
is to a large extent saturated. Even though our picture is static, we shall claim, in the final section, that in a
dynamic setting technological innovation (i.e. changes in N and/or C) driven by total output growth are likely
to drive the economy close to the critical value N/C = 2.
After discussing the model in the next Section we present, in Section 3, the main results. In order not
to obscure the emergent picture, a detailed account of the approach and of the calculation is given in the
appendix. More specific and quantitative results will be discussed in Section 4 and in Section 5 we argue that
economies self-organize close to the critical point n ≈ 2. We close by summarizing our results and discussing
some perspectives in the final section.
We made an effort to keep the discussion and the mathematical complexity at the simplest level, even at
the price of introducing restrictive or unrealistic assumptions. The present approach can however be easily
generalized to more realistic (and more complicated) models.
2 The model
We consider an economy with C commodities, N firms endowed with random technologies, and one represen-
tative consumer. Firms strive to maximize their respective profits, while the consumer aims at maximizing
his utility. The two problems are interconnected by the market clearing condition. In detail, we consider the
following setup.
The company i (i = 1, . . . , N) is characterized by a technology (or activity) with constant returns to scale
that, when run at scale si = 1 produces q
c
i > 0 or consumes q
c
i < 0 units of commodity c (c = 1, . . . , C).
If the technology qi = {qci }Cc=1 is operated at a scale si > 0, then firm i produces or consumes siqci units of
commodity c. Technologies cannot be reversed, i.e. si ≥ 0. Following [11], we do not restrict our attention
to Leontiev input-output models: each activity can have several outputs (joint production) and there are no
primary production factors (i.e. qci > 0 is possible for all c). As in [11], it will be important to impose that it
is impossible to produce a positive amount of some commodity without consuming a positive amount of some
other commodity. A sufficient condition to ensure this is that
∀i :
C∑
c=1
qci = −ǫ. (1)
Here ǫ is the difference between the quantities of inputs and outputs, which measures the inefficiency of the
transformation process of technology i.
The profit of firm i is πi = si(p ·qi) ≡ si
∑C
c=1 q
c
ip
c, where p = {pc}Cc=1 is the price vector, which we assume
to be non-negative. Each firm fixes si by solving the problem
max
si≥0
πi (2)
at fixed prices.
The representative consumer, whose utility function we denote by U(·) and whose initial endowment we
denote by x0, chooses his consumption x = {xc}Cc=1 by solving
max
x∈B
U(x), B = {xc ≥ 0 : p · x ≤ p · x0} (3)
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at fixed prices. B represents the set of consumption plans that satisfy the consumer’s budget constraint.
At equilibrium, the total supply of each commodity is required to match the demand from the representative
consumer (market clearing), i.e.
∀c : xc = xc0 +
N∑
i=1
siq
c
i (4)
The simultaneous solution of the maximization problems (2) and (3) subject to (4) constitutes the competitive
equilibrium we will study in this paper.
Before specifying further our model, it is worth to make a couple of remarks. First, multiplying both sides
of (4) by pc and summing over c one finds that, in equilibrium,
p · (x− x0) =
N∑
i=1
si(p · qi) =
N∑
i=1
πi = 0 (5)
The last equality comes from the fact that p · (x−x0) ≤ 0 because of the budget constraint and πi ≥ 0 because
firms can always achieve πi = 0 by not producing. So, on one side one recovers Walras’ Law p · (x − x0) = 0,
while on the other we find that πi = 0 for all firms.
Notice also that, combining (1) with the market clearing condition we find that in equilibrium
C∑
c=1
(xc − xc0) = −ǫ
N∑
i=1
si (6)
This equation means that total equilibrium consumption will be lower than the initial one. The model thus
focuses on the ability of the productive sector to provide scarce goods (with small xc0) using as inputs abundant
commodities (with large xc0) so as to increase welfare.
We assume that technologies qci are given by
qci = r
c
i −
ǫ
C
− 1
C
C∑
c=1
rci (7)
where rci are independent Gaussian random variables, with zero mean and variance ∆/C and the last two terms
enforce the constraint (1). Appendix B shows that the assumption on the distribution of qci can be relaxed
considerably for our purposes1.
In what follows, we shall use the notation 〈. . .〉u,v,...,z for expected values over the distributions of the
variables u, v, . . . , z, but we shall omit the subscript when no confusion is possible.
Commodities are a priori equivalent. The initial endowments xc0 are drawn at random from a distribution
ρ(·), independently for each c. Furthermore we shall also suppose that
U(x) =
C∑
c=1
u(xc) (8)
where u(·) is postulated to be increasing (u′(x) > 0) and convex (u′′(x) < 0). These assumptions, which simplify
our analysis considerably, appear to be extremely restrictive. They appear less unrealistic considering, as in [12],
that x may measure desirable characteristics or properties of commodities rather than quantities thereof. In
this light, the departure from Leontiev technologies with a single output becomes natural.
It is also useful to introduce a measure of economic activity similar to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
The total market value of all goods produced is the sum of (xc−xc0)pc for all c with xc > xc0. Because of Walras’
law (5), this is equal to 12
∑
c |xc − xc0|pc. Normalizing prices to the average price level, we obtain
GDP = C
∑C
c=1 |xc − xc0|pc
2
∑C
c=1 p
c
. (9)
The key parameters of the model are thus N, C, ǫ, ∆, the distribution ρ(·) of the initial endowments, and
the utility function u(·). We shall focus on the non trivial limit N →∞ defined as
(n)
lim
N→∞
≡ lim
N→∞
n=N/C
(10)
1In fact, any distribution which satisfies (1) and has a characteristic function log
〈
eikq
c
i
〉
q
= ψ(k/
√
C) with ψ(x) = −∆x2/2 +
O(x3) would leave our results unchanged.
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where n = N/C is held fixed as N →∞.
A simple geometric argument, for ǫ = 0, suggests that n = 2 will play an important role. Let us write the
initial endowments as xc0 = x¯0 + δx
c
0, separating a constant part (x¯0) from a fluctuating part (δx
c
0) such that∑
c δx
c = 0. With ǫ = 0, Eq. (6) implies that the component of consumption along the constant vector remains
constant. All the transformations take place in the space orthogonal to the constant vector: qi · x0 = qi · δx0.
In other words, those technologies with qi · δx0 < 0 which reduce the initial spread of endowments δx0 lead to
a increase in wealth and hence will be run at a positive scale. Those with a positive component along δx0 will
have si = 0. Given that the probability to generate randomly a vector in the half-space {q : q ·δx0 < 0} is 1/2,
when N is large we expect N/2 active firms. Still the number of possible active firms is bounded above by C,
hence when n = N/C = 2 the space of technologies becomes complete and xc = x¯0 ∀c. There is no possibility
to increase welfare further. We shall see that n = 2 separates two distinct regimes of equilibria even with ǫ > 0.
It is easy to see that the problem of finding equilibrium prices, production scales and consumption levels of
the economy in the above setting is reduced to the following:
max
{si≥0}
U
(
x0 +
N∑
i=1
siqi
)
(11)
Given the solution {s∗i } to this problem, the equilibrium consumption levels are given by the market clearing
condition (4) and the (relative) prices are derived from marginal utilities as2
pc =
∂U
∂xc
∣∣∣∣
x∗
= u′(x∗c) (12)
Eq. (11) is a typical problem in statistical mechanics. The general approach to this type of issues is discussed
in Appendix A. Equilibrium quantities are random variables because of the randomness in the technologies qi
and in the initial endowments x0. Still there are statistical properties of the equilibrium which hold almost
surely in the limit (10). These will be the subject of our interest. In Section 3, we present the general solution,
while in Section 4 we shall specialize to specific examples. The reader interested in technical details is referred
to the appendices for a detailed account of the method and of the explicit calculation.
3 The solution and its generic properties
As shown in appendices A and B, the solution of the equilibrium problem (11) in the limit N → ∞ with
n = N/C fixed is given by
(n)
lim
N→∞
1
N
〈
max
s
U
(
x0 +
∑
i
siq
)〉
q
= h(Ω∗, κ∗, p∗, σ∗, χ∗, χˆ∗) (13)
where
h(Ω, κ, p, σ, χ, χˆ) =
〈
max
s≥0
[
(tσ − ǫp)s− 1
2
χˆs2
]〉
t
+
1
2
Ωχˆ+
1
n
κp− 1
2n∆
χσ2 − 1
2n
χp2+
+
1
n
〈
max
x≥0
[
u(x)− 1
2χ
(
x− x0 + κ+
√
n∆Ωt
)2]〉
t,x0
(14)
and Ω∗, . . . , χˆ∗ are the saddle point values of the parameters, i.e. those which solves the system of equations
∂h
∂Ω = 0, . . . ,
∂h
∂χˆ = 0. The variables Ω, κ, p, σ, χ, χˆ are called order parameters in statistical physics
3. They
emerge from the analytic approach (see appendices A and B) as the key macroscopic variables which describe
the collective behavior of the equilibria.
In Eq. (14) t is a Gaussian r.v., with zero mean and unit variance and as usual 〈. . .〉t, 〈. . .〉t,x0 stand for
expectation values on t and on t and x0, respectively. The precise derivation of this result is described in
Appendix B.
The structure of h is reminiscent of the original problem. The first term on the r.h.s. can indeed be regarded
as the profit maximization of a “representative” firm. The variable s is indeed one of the variables si which
2Utility maximization under the budget constraint, Eq. (3), yields ∂U/∂xc = λpc where λ is the Lagrange multiplier imposing
the budget constraint. We can take λ = 1 exploiting the invariance pc → apc for any a > 0, thus fixing the level of absolute prices.
3In order to keep notation simple, we shall generally omit in what follows the asterisk on order parameters which denotes saddle
point values.
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appear in the original problem (11). The solution of the maximization problem in the first term of Eq. (14) is
given by
s∗(t) =
{
(tσ − ǫp)/χˆ if t ≥ ǫp/σ
0 if t < ǫp/σ
(15)
Since t is a random variable, s∗ is also a random variable and its probability density can be derived from that
of t. The result is
Q(s) = (1− φ)δ(s) + χˆ√
2πσ
Θ(s) exp
[
− (χˆs+ ǫp)
2
2σ2
]
, φ =
1
2
erfc
(
ǫp√
2σ
)
(16)
where Θ(s) = 0 for s ≤ 0 and Θ(s) = 1 for s > 0. The variable s is the scale of production of a (representative)
firm, hence (16) yields the distribution of si in the economy and φ is the fraction of technologies that are active
(i.e. such that si > 0).
Likewise, the last term on the r.h.s. of Eq. (14) is related to utility maximization with respect to a
“representative” commodity. The variable x is indeed one of the variables xc which appear in the original
problem. The solution of this problem is given by
x∗(t, x0) : χu
′(x∗) = x∗ − x0 + κ+
√
n∆Ωt (17)
which is always positive provided u′(x) → ∞ for x → 0. The probability density of xc in the economy can
be derived from that of t and x0 in the same way as above for the scale si of production. The conditional
probability of xc given xc0 is computed in Appendix C. The result is
P (x|x0) = 1− χu
′′(x)√
2πn∆Ω
exp
{
− (x− x0 − χu
′(x) + κ)2
2n∆Ω
]
(18)
Hence the variable x− χu′(x) has a Gaussian distribution with mean x0 − κ and variance n∆Ω.
The two “representative” problems are coupled in a nontrivial way through the other terms in (14).
The structure of the solution becomes more clear if we analyze the set of saddle point equations ∂h∂Ω =
0, . . . , ∂h∂χˆ = 0, with θ = (Ω, κ, p, σ, χ, χˆ). After some algebra (see appendix B), these can be cast in the
following form:
p = 〈u′(x∗)〉t,x0 (19)
χˆ =
√
∆
nΩ
〈u′(x∗)t〉t,x0 (20)
σ =
√
∆
[〈
(u′(x∗))
2
〉
t,x0
− 〈u′(x∗)〉2t,x0
]
(21)
Ω =
〈
(s∗)2
〉
t
(22)
χ =
n∆
σ
〈s∗t〉t (23)
κ = pχ+ nǫ 〈s∗〉t (24)
The first of these equations relates the parameter p to the average (relative) price because of (12), while the
third one implies that σ is a measure of price fluctuations4.
Using these relations (see appendix D for details) one finds that at the saddle point
h(Ω∗, κ∗, p∗, σ∗, χ∗, χˆ∗) =
1
n
〈u(x∗)〉t,x0 (25)
This is indeed what we expect looking at the original problem (11). Furthermore, taking the expected value of
(17) and combining it with (19) and (24) yields χ 〈u′(x∗)〉t,x0 = χp = 〈x∗〉t,x0 −〈x0〉x0 + κ = 〈x∗〉t,x0 −〈x0〉x0 +
pχ+ nǫ 〈s∗〉t. Then
〈x∗〉t,x0 = 〈x0〉x0 − nǫ 〈s∗〉t (26)
which is exactly Eq. (6). Finally, it is possible to show (see Appendix D) that Eq.s (19–24) also “contain”
Walras’ law in the form
〈u′(x∗)(x∗ − x0)〉t,x0 = 0. (27)
4It is possible to derive an explicit analytic form of (22), (23) and (24) in terms of error functions. The present formulas are
however more suited for the discussion which follows.
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The dependence on ∆ of the solution can be clarified by a rescaling argument: changing variables to p′ = p,
χˆ′ = χˆ/∆, σ′ = σ/
√
∆, Ω′ = ∆Ω, χ′ = χ and κ′ = κ one finds that the solution only depends on the parameter
ǫ′ = ǫ/∆. Hence the behavior of the solution with respect to ∆ is easily related to the dependence on ǫ with
∆ = 1. Notice that, a dependence on ∆ remains after the change of variables in the distribution of si, Eq. (16).
This means that production scales satisfy the scaling relation
si(∆) = si(1)/
√
∆ (28)
The behavior of the solution when the spread of the initial endowments
〈
δx20
〉 ≡ 〈(x0 − 〈x0〉)2〉 is very small can
be computed with asymptotic expansion methods. The key observation in the expansion (see appendix E) is
that x∗ also has very small fluctuations. This, in turn, implies that prices also have very small fluctuations,
indeed σ ∼= |u′′(〈x0〉)|
√
〈δx20〉. The scales of production also vanish when
〈
δx20
〉 → 0, but with a singular
exponential behavior:
Ω ∝ 〈δx20〉3/2 e−A/〈δx20〉, 〈δx20〉≪ 1 (29)
for some constant A. Hence we find that no economic activity takes place (φ → 0, Ω → 0, 〈s∗〉t → 0) in the
limit of uniform endowments (see Appendix E for technical details). This is what one should expect from the
beginning: when the consumer is endowed with the same amount of equally valued commodities, there is no
transformation (with ǫ ≥ 0) which can increase welfare.
A further interesting limit, for which we can derive generic results, is that of vanishing ǫ. Setting ǫ = 0 one
finds in a straightforward way that Ω = σ2/(2χˆ2), χ = n∆/(2χˆ) and k = pχ. Eq. (7) yields φ = 1/2 which
means that half of the firms are active, in agreement with the geometric argument of the previous section for
n < 2. When n → 2− the equations develop a singularity: Indeed χˆ ∝ (2 − n), σ ∝ √2− n vanish whereas
the average scale of production diverges 〈s∗〉 ∝ 1/√2− n. A detailed account is given in Appendix F. The
case n > 2 is more subtle as it requires a careful asymptotic study of the limit ǫ → 0 where again realizing
that x∗ has small fluctuations of order ǫ is crucial. The bottom line is that (see appendix F for details) price
fluctuations vanish linearly with ǫ, i.e. σ ∝ ǫ but also χˆ ∝ ǫ so the factors ǫp/χˆ and σ/χˆ in Eq. (15) are finite.
Hence scales of production remain finite, as ǫ → 0 and they diverge when n → 2+ as 〈s∗〉 ∝ 1/√n− 2. The
fraction of active firms turns out to be φ = 1/n, which means that there are exactly C firms operating.
Eq.s (25), (26) and (27) show that the saddle point equations, which represent the simplest mathematical
description of the random economy in its full complexity, manage to capture in a compact, though somewhat
intricate, way the basic properties of the economy. This is a useful consistency check. The best way to unravel
the resulting behavior beyond these generic laws is however to specialize to particular cases.
4 The solution: typical cases
In this section we display the behavior of the solution outlined in the previous section for some particular choices
of the functions u(x) and ρ(x0). In spite of their apparent complexity, Eq.s (19–24) can be solved numerically
to any desired degree of accuracy. Using the scaling argument above, we can safely restrict ourselves to study
the dependence on ǫ setting ∆ = 1, without any loss of generality.
We shall henceforth set
u(x) = log x. (30)
We start our discussion from the case
ρ(x0) = e
−x0 , x0 ≥ 0. (31)
Fig. 1 compares the numerical solution with computer experiments. We generate many realizations of the
random economy and compute numerically the equilibria for each of them. The analytical results we obtain
in the limit C → ∞ turn out to give a quite accurate description of the behavior of relatively small systems5
(i.e. C = 16) even for a single realization. Fig. 1 shows that there are essentially two different regimes. For
n < nc = 2 roughly half of the firms are active, whereas for n≫ nc the number of active firms saturates to C.
The GDP also shows a similar behavior. It increases with n and saturates for n > 2.
The transition between the two regimes becomes sharper when ǫ decreases and it gives rise to a singularity
in the limit ǫ→ 0, as we have seen in the previous section. This is clearly visible in Fig. 2, where we plot the
behavior of various quantities as a function of n for different values of ǫ.
For n < nc the average scale of production 〈s∗〉 increases with n. This means that, in this region, existing
firms benefit from the entry of a new technology (i.e. if N → N + 1, see later). This positive complementarity
arises because the new firm increases the availability of inputs to other firms.
5We resorted to a simple iterative scheme to converge to the equilibria. This fails to converge properly for C or N too large or
for ǫ≪ 1.
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Figure 1: Comparison between the analytic solution for N →∞ (full line) and equilibria of random economies
computed numerically for C = 16 and 32. The parameters are ǫ = 0.05 and ∆ = 1 whereas initial endowments
are drawn from an exponential distribution. Dots refer to a single realization with C = 32 whereas the dotted
(dashed) line is the average over 100 realizations for C = 16 (32). Left: nφ, which is the number of active firms
(si > 0) divided by C, versus n. Right: GDP versus n. Insets in these figures show the behavior of φ and of
GDP for ǫ = 0.01, 0.05, 0.1 and 0.5 from top to bottom.
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Figure 2: Behavior of equilibrium quantities as a function of n for ǫ = 0.5, 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01. In all cases
∆ = 1 and ρ(x) = e−x. Top left: 〈s∗〉. Bottom left: relative price fluctuations. Here we identify prices with
marginal utility p = u′(x∗) and δp = u′(x∗) − 〈u′(x∗)〉. Top right: average consumption 〈x∗〉. Bottom right:
relative fluctuations of consumption δx = x∗ − 〈x∗〉.
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Figure 3: Probability density functions of operation scales s (left) and of consumptions x (right) at equilibrium
for ǫ = 0.01 and n = 0.5, 2 and 5.
For n > nc, instead 〈s∗〉 decreases with n, the introduction of a new technology typically causes a reduction in
the scale of activity of the already existing firms. When ǫ→ 0 the curves develop a singularity 〈s∗〉 ∼ 1/
√
|n− 2|
at nc = 2, as discussed in the previous section.
As n increases relative price fluctuations decrease. But the decrease becomes very sharp close to nc for
ǫ ≪ 1. In this case, at nc price fluctuations suddenly drop to a level close to zero. This is related to the
behavior of the variable x∗ shown in the right panel of Fig. 2. In the region below nc the average consumption
level decreases. In this region firms take advantage of the spread
〈δx〉
〈x〉 =
√
〈x2〉 − 〈x〉2
〈x〉 (32)
between scarce and abundant goods to make a living. But as n approaches nc, the spread in x quickly drops to
a very low value, making life more difficult. Increasing n beyond nc = 2, the economy becomes very selective
toward increasingly efficient technologies which can perform the desired transformation between commodities
with a smaller decrease in the average level 〈x〉 of consumption. This is clearly shown in Fig. 3 where we plot
the probability densities of x for three different values of n = 0.5, 2 and 5. The right plot shows that while for
n = 0.5 the distribution P (x|·), Eq. (18), retains the character of the distribution of initial endowments ρ(x0),
it becomes more and more peaked around 〈x0〉 as n increases. At the same time the distribution of s, Eq. (16),
becomes broader and broader.
The distribution of si, Eq. (16), which may be considered as a proxy for firm sizes, gets broader and broader
as n increases. Interestingly mature economies, such as Japan [13] or the US [14], are characterized by a very
broad distribution of firm sizes, which we can put in relation with Q(s). The shape of the distribution found
empirically is close to a power law, which is different from (16). However, it is not difficult to derive a power
law distribution of s relaxing the unrealistic assumption that all firms have the same value of ∆ and ǫ [15].
The generic picture of the overall economy depicted thus far remains unchanged for different distributions
ρ(x0) of initial endowments or for different utility functions u(x). For example, Fig. 4 shows the results obtained
with
ρ(x0) = (1− f)δ(x0) + fδ(x0 − 1). (33)
This captures the situation where only a fraction f of the commodities is present in initial endowments (primary
goods) whereas the remaining commodities have to be provided by the productive sector. The behavior of φ,
〈x∗〉 and relative prices is very similar to that found for the previous model. Fig. 4 shows that the average scale
of production and the relative fluctuations of xc show a qualitatively different behavior. Again the two regimes
with clearly distinct properties can be identified for n < nc and n > nc.
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Figure 4: Left: Scale of production (top) and consumption fluctuations (bottom) as a function of n for a bimodal
distribution of initial endowments (Eq. 33) with f = 0.2 and x0 = 5 (ǫ = 0.01). Right: distribution of x for
n = 1, 2 and 5 from top to bottom.
5 Discussion
The behavior of the solution with n allows us to identify two classes of economies: mature economies (n > 2)
with a full-blown repertoire of technologies which closely saturate consumer’s demand and immature economies
(n < 2) characterized by few technologies scattered in a large space of productive opportunities.
Strictly speaking, our considerations must be limited to comparative statics in view of the static nature of the
equilibrium we study. However it is suggestive consider dynamic transitions between equilibria. In particular,
a transitions N → N + 1, corresponding to the draw of a new technology, can be considered as the result of
the discovery of a new method of combining inputs to produce desirable outputs; a new design as Romer [21]
calls it. Note however that in Romer’s model innovation entails the discovery of a new intermediate commodity
and there is no real “combination” of inputs and no heterogeneity across technologies. By contrast, innovation
in our model describes the expansion of the frontier of feasible industrial transformation processes by discovery
of a new activities which is structurally different from existing ones6; both the discrete nature of designs and
the uncertainty of the discovery process are retained. Whether an innovation leading to the draw of a new
technology is adopted or not will depends on the specific technologies that are already present7 Generalizing,
one may also consider transitions C → C + 1 introducing a new commodity or characteristic [11], or which
makes it possible to consume it.
In such a dynamic view8, it is essential to consider the incentives for innovations in order to understand
which transitions will most likely be generated endogenously. If we assume that transition rates depend on
investments in research for new technologies, and that investment are related to expected changes in GDP
generated by technological changes, then Fig. 5 suggests that the economy will drift towards n ≈ 2. Indeed
transitions N → N + 1 cause an increase in GDP which is sizeable for n < 2 and almost negligible for n > 2
(specially for small ǫ). On the contrary, transitions C → C + 1 which decrease n increase substantially GDP
only for n > 2.
The same conclusion can be reached assuming that investment in research arise from the productive sector
6This is only one of the possible modes of technological innovations. Innovations may also increase the efficiency of an existing
technology, e.g. decreasing the input requirements, which may be captured by changes in ǫi and ∆i. Our focus here is on structural
technological change.
7It has been argued that technological innovation is path dependent [16]. This means that the draw of the N + 1st technology
depends on the N technologies which are already present. Such issues can clearly not be addressed within our quasi-static approach.
8For example consider the following cartoon of an evolving economy: In each period t Nature endows the representative consumer
with a bundle x0(t) of commodities, drawn at random from the distribution ρ0. Given the existing technologies, {qi : i =
1, . . . , N(t)} this is transformed into the optimal bundle x(t) by the productive sector then x(t) is consumed at the end of period
t. Finally an innovation event, i.e. a transition N(t) → N(t + 1) = N(t) + 1 or C(t) → C(t + 1) = C(t) + 1 may take place.
It is implicit in this description that technological change occurs on a much longer time scale than that needed for the economy
to reach equilibrium. This view may also describe the way in which existing technologies diffuse in a developing country. Then
technologies are not discovered anew, but just become operative or feasible as e.g. human capital or infrastructure accumulates, or
as institutional constraints are removed.
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Figure 5: Variation of GDP for N → N + 1 (full lines) and for C → C + 1 (dashed lines). Here u(x) = log x
and ρ(x0) = e
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itself. Indeed the average scale 〈s∗〉 of activity of firms increases with n for n < 2, which means that a transition
N → N + 1 causes an increase in the average scale of activities already active. This means that, at the
equilibrium prices of the economy with N < 2C technologies, the profits of already existing firms increase on
average when the new technology is introduced. Likewise, the decrease of 〈s∗〉 with n for n > 2 suggests that
transitions C → C +1 increase firms profits, on average, for n > 2. This again yields a drift towards n ≈ 2 due
to endogenous technological change.
These arguments suggest that economies may spontaneously evolve towards a critical state, i.e. that they
may be a further realization of self-organized criticality [17].
6 Conclusions
Summarizing, we have addressed the problem of calculating the general equilibria of large linear production
economies with random technologies and a single consumer with tools of statistical physics. In a nutshell,
our results can be stated as follows. When the ratio n of the number of available technologies to the number
of commodities is below a threshold nc = 2, the average operation scale grows as n increases and roughly
one-half of the firms are active. For n < 2, new technologies are easily accepted and the economy on the
whole expands with n. When n > nc, instead, the production sector is saturated, i.e. the number of active
technologies converges to the number of commodities, and new technologies are accepted only at the expense
of reducing the operation scales of the other technologies. The transition becomes more and more sharp as the
parameter ǫ, measuring the inefficiency of each technology, approaches zero. From the consumer’s viewpoint,
welfare increases with n in both regimes. The main component of welfare increase with n is different in the
two regimes: for n < nc, welfare level grows with n because the spread in consumption levels 〈δx〉 decreases
with the introduction of technologies which transform abundant commodities into scarce ones. For n > nc,
instead, growth arises from the introduction of more efficient technologies, granting an increase in the level of
consumption 〈x∗〉. Accordingly, the relative spread of prices 〈δp〉 / 〈p〉 decreases with n.
Considering the incentives for technological innovations, we uncover a mechanism by which the economy
self-organizes to the critical state ≈ 2. Our model clearly is unrealistic in many respects. Still it may capture
some novel aspects of structural technological change. The extension of these approach to a fully dynamic
setting, including capital accumulation, may shed new light on theories of endogenous economic growth.
Above all, we propose the use of statistical mechanics of disordered systems to study the typical properties of
the general equilibria of large random economies. We have shown how these methods are able to deal effectively
10
with heterogeneity, providing a complete statistical description of the equilibria, which is consistent with generic
results. The relevant quantities – called order parameters – are naturally identified by the method. Given the non
standard type of the calculations involved, we also present computer experiments which convincingly support
our results.
The approach generalizes in a straightforward way to more complex situations and we hope that this work
will stimulate cross-fertilization between the fields of economic theory and statistical mechanics.
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Appendices
A The method
The standard technique to maximize a function of N variables with N → ∞ in statistical mechanics relies on
the well-known steepest descent, or saddle point, method. Let HN (·) be an extensive9 function of s = {si}Ni=1,
and imagine that we want to compute the maximum value of HN (s)/N in the limit N →∞. Then
lim
N→∞
1
N
max
s
HN (s) = lim
β→∞
lim
N→∞
1
βN
logZN(β) (34)
where
ZN(β) =
∫
ds eβHN (s) (35)
is called the partition function associated to HN . Here
∫
ds stands for an N -dimensional integral on the whole
domain of definition of s. The idea of (35) is that the integral for β ≫ 1 is dominated by regions where HN
is maximal. This recipe turns the problem of maximizing h into that of calculating ZN and evaluating the
asymptotic behavior of its logarithm.
This task becomes much more difficult when HN depends on a set of random variables q with probability
density p(q). We denote this dependence by HN (·|q). The generic situation is that q enters the definition of
the interactions among the N components of s and HN is a sum over all interaction terms. In such situations,
we expect that a sufficiently regular HN will obey the law of large numbers, so that e.g
lim
N→∞
1
N
max
s
HN (s|q) = lim
N→∞
1
N
〈[
max
s
HN (s|q)
]〉
q
(36)
In other words, maxHN/N is expected to be a self-averaging quantity, namely to have vanishing sample-to-
sample fluctuations in the limit N →∞. If one wanted to generalize (34) to the evaluation of (36), one would
have to compute the q-average of the logarithm of the partition function ZN(β|q). Unfortunately, the logarithm
prevents every useful factorization of such an average and makes this way impracticable.
The replica method is the standard statistical mechanical technique to circumvent this difficulty. Using the
formula
logZN (β|q) = lim
r→0
[ZN (β|q)]r − 1
r
(37)
we can reduce our problem to that of computing 〈[ZN(β|q)]r〉q. This is feasible for integer values of r because
it amounts to computing
[ZN(β|q)]r =
[∫
eβHN (s|q)ds
]r
=
∫
eβ
∑
r
a=1 HN (sa|q)
r∏
a=1
dsa (38)
9I.e. such that there are two constants k+ and k− satisfying k−N < HN (s) < k+N for all N and s.
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which is the partition function of r “replicas” of the original system with the same disorder realization q (hence
the name of the method). The last step consists in performing an analytic continuation for real values of r and
taking the limit r → 0:
lim
N→∞
1
N
〈
max
s
HN (s|q)
〉
q
= lim
N→∞
lim
β→∞
lim
r→0
1
βNr
log 〈[ZN (β|q)]r〉q . (39)
The existence and uniqueness of the limit r → 0, which looks somewhat bizarre, have been much debated in the
physics literature (see [18] for a discussion). Even if this method remains a formally non-rigorous procedure,
several rigorous mathematical results confirm its validity in problems that are more complex that the one we
deal with here [19,20]. We hope this (together with the agreement with computer experiments) gives the reader
a sufficient level of confidence to accept the r → 0 passage.
The technical part of the calculation lies in the introduction of a finite number of auxiliary integration
variables θ = {θ1, . . . , θk} allowing the averaged replicated partition function to be re-cast in the form
〈[ZN (β|q)]r〉q ≃
∫
eβNr[h(θ)+o(r,β,θ)]dθ (40)
where h(·) is some function and o(r, β, ·) → 0 in the limits β → ∞, r → 0. The θ variables are called order
parameters. Their nature and number are dictated by the mathematical structure of the problem (see Appendix
B for the details of our case). Finally, assuming that the limits r → 0 and N →∞ commute, the latter can be
taken first in (39) thus allowing to evaluate (40) by the saddle-point method as
〈[ZN (β|q)]r〉q ∼ eβNr[h(θ
∗)+o(r,β,θ∗)] (41)
where θ∗ is the saddle point value of θ which dominates the integral in (40). Hence, putting things together,
lim
N→∞
1
N
〈
max
s
HN (s|q)
〉
q
= lim
N→∞
lim
β→∞
lim
r→0
1
βNr
log eβNr[h(θ
∗)+o(r,β,θ∗)] = h(θ∗) (42)
The core of the procedure lies in (40) where, by a lengthy calculation one identifies the relevant order
parameters θ and the function h. This crucial but technical step is presented below (appendix B) for our
problem.
B The explicit calculation of the representative agent problem
The partition function in our case reads
ZN (β|q) =
∫ ∞
0
eβU
(
x0+
∑
N
i=1 siqi
)
ds (43)
with U(x) the utility function of the representative consumer. As stated above, in order to analyze the statistical
properties of the equilibria we have to evaluate 〈[ZN(β|q)]r〉q and resort to (39), with HN given in our case
by U and with all the necessary constraints. Before proceeding, we shall introduce some useful definitions and
identities. The first one is the δ-function δ(x) which is defined through the relation
f(y) =
∫
R
δ(x− y)f(x)dx (44)
for any function f(·) and y ∈ R. We will also use the exponential representation of the δ-function
δ(x) =
∫
R
eix̂x
dx̂
2π
(45)
Another mathematical tool we will use is the Gaussian or Hubbard-Stratonovich transformation, viz.
exp
[
b2
2
]
=
∫
R
exp
[
−x
2
2
+ bx
]
dx√
2π
(46)
which allows to linearize arguments of exponentials at the cost of introducing averages over Gaussian r.v.’s.
Now, in order to perform our calculation it is convenient to replace the consumption variables x by writing
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explicitly the market clearing condition (4) in the partition function (43). To do so we use the defining property
(44) of δ-distributions and write
ZN(β|q) =
∫ ∞
0
dx
∫ ∞
0
ds eβU(x)
C∏
c=1
δ
(
xc − xc0 −
N∑
i=1
siq
c
i
)
(47)
As already explained in Sec. A we will have to take the following steps: (a) average the partition function of r
replicas over technologies, as in (40); (b) identify the correct order parameters of the problem to write the latter
average as in (40); (c) take the limits N →∞ and r → 0 and get something of the form of (42); and finally (d)
find the values of the order parameters at the competitive equilibrium (i.e. when β →∞).
The partition function of r replicas reads
[ZN (β|q)]r =
∫ ∞
0
r∏
a=1
dxa
∫ ∞
0
r∏
a=1
dsa e
β
∑ r
a=1 U(xa)
r∏
a=1
C∏
c=1
δ
(
xca − xc0 −
N∑
i=1
si,aq
c
i
)
(48)
Notice that the dependence on the technologies appears in the market clearing condition only, so that the
average 〈. . .〉q involves only the last part of [ZN (β|q)]r. This average one must take into account the constraint
(1), i.e.
〈· · ·〉q =
〈∏N
i=1 δ
(∑C
c=1 q
c
i + ǫ
)
(· · · )
〉′
q〈∏N
i=1 δ
(∑C
c=1 q
c
i + ǫ
)〉′
q
(49)
where 〈· · ·〉′q stands for the average over unconstrained i.i.d. Gaussian vectors q with zero mean and variance〈
q2
〉
q
=
∑
c
〈
(qc)2
〉
q
= ∆. Using Eq. (45) for the constraints, the denominator becomes
〈
N∏
i=1
δ
( C∑
c=1
qci + ǫ
)〉′
q
=
N∏
i=1
1√
2π∆
exp
[
− ǫ
2
2∆
]
(50)
while for the numerator we get
〈
N∏
i=1
δ
( C∑
c=1
qci + ǫ
) r∏
a=1
C∏
c=1
δ
(
xca − xc0 −
N∑
i=1
si,aq
c
i
)〉′
q
=
=
∫ N∏
i=1
dẑi
2π
∫ r∏
a=1
dx̂a
2π
exp
[
iǫ
N∑
i=1
ẑi + i
r∑
a=1
C∑
c=1
x̂ca
(
xca − xc0
)− ∆
2C
N∑
i=1
C∑
c=1
(
ẑi −
r∑
a=1
x̂casi,a
)2]
(51)
Notice that the expected values involved in these calculations are all of the form ψ(y) =
〈
eiyq
c
i
〉
q
. This is the
characteristic function of qci and for the assumed Gaussian distribution it takes the form ψ(y) = e
−∆y2/(2C).
This result can however be extended to any distribution of qci with ψ(y) = ψ˜(y/
√
C) with a leading behavior
ψ˜(x) = −∆x2/2 + O(x3). Indeed all higher order terms in the power expansion of ψ˜ give vanishingly small
contributions with respect to the first, in the limit C →∞.
Gathering all the terms, we have
〈[ZN (β|q)]r〉q =
∫ N∏
i=1
dẑi
2π
∫ r∏
a=1
dx̂a
2π
∫ ∞
0
r∏
a=1
dxa
∫ ∞
0
r∏
a=1
dsa exp
[
β
r∑
a=1
U(xa) + iǫ
N∑
i=1
ẑi+ (52)
+i
r∑
a=1
C∑
c=1
x̂ca
(
xca − xc0
)− ∆
2C
N∑
i=1
C∑
c=1
(
ẑi −
r∑
a=1
x̂casi,a
)2][ N∏
i=1
1√
2π∆
exp
[
− ǫ
2
2∆
]]−1
(53)
In order to write the above in a form as simple as (40), the set of order parameters to be introduced must
allow for a decoupling of the integrals over the variables ẑi, si,a and x̂
c
a in such a way that the integrals on the
different variables can be factorized. Here it is enough to introduce the following order parameters
ωab =
1
N
N∑
i=1
si,asi,b and ka =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ẑisi,a (54)
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through identities such as
1 =
∫
dωab Nδ
(
Nωab −
N∑
i=1
si,asi,b
)
=
∫
dωabdω̂ab
2πi/N
eω̂ab[Nωab−
∑
i si,asi,b] (55)
Then last term in the exponent of the numerator of Eq. (53) becomes
N∑
i=1
(
ẑi −
r∑
a=1
x̂casi,a
)2
=
N∑
i=1
ẑ2i − 2N
r∑
a=1
kax̂
c
a +N
r∑
a,b=1
ωabx̂
c
ax̂
c
b (56)
This allows us to separate the problem into three parts. Indeed we can re-cast the replicated partition function
in the form of a set of integrals over the order parameters:
〈[ZN (β|q)]r〉q =
∫ r∏
a,b=1
dωabdω̂ab
4πi/N
∫ r∏
a=1
dkadk̂a
2πi/N
exp
[
Nh({ωab}, {ω̂ab}, {ka}, {k̂a})
]
(57)
where h = g1 + g2 + g3 is the sum of three terms which can be computed independently. In particular
g1 ≡ g1({ωab}, {ω̂ab}, {ka}, {k̂a}) = −1
2
r∑
a,b=1
ω̂abωab −
r∑
a=1
k̂aka (58)
g2 ≡ g2({ω̂ab}, {k̂a}) = log
∫
dẑ
2π
∫ ∞
0
r∏
a=1
dsa exp
[1
2
r∑
a,b=1
ω̂absasb + ẑ
r∑
a=1
k̂asa + iǫẑ − ∆
2
ẑ2
]
− log
[
1√
2π∆
exp
[
− ǫ
2
2∆
]]
(59)
g3 ≡ g3({ωab}, {ka}) = 1
N
C∑
c=1
log
∫ r∏
a=1
dx̂a
2π
∫ ∞
0
r∏
a=1
dxa exp
[
β
r∑
a=1
u(xa) + i
r∑
a=1
x̂a
(
xa − xc0
)
−n∆
2
r∑
a,b=1
x̂ax̂bωab + n∆
r∑
a=1
x̂aka
]
(60)
with n = N/C. The order parameters k̂a have appeared after using an identity similar to (55) for ka. Now (57)
is precisely of the form (40).
In the limit N → ∞ the integrals appearing in (57) are dominated by the contributions coming from the
saddle-point of h and the solution of our specific problem can be written as
(n)
lim
N→∞
1
N
〈
max
s
U(x)
〉
q
= lim
β→∞
lim
r→0
1
βr
h({ω∗ab}, {ω̂∗ab}, {k∗a}, {k̂∗a}) (61)
where the ∗ means that parameters take their saddle point value, i.e. those who solve the system of equations
∂h
∂ωab
= 0,
∂h
∂ω̂ab
= 0,
∂h
∂ka
= 0,
∂h
∂k̂a
= 0 (62)
for all a, b = 1, . . . , r. Ideally one should first solve these equations for generic r and then take the limit r → 0.
A word about the meaning of the order parameters introduced thus far is in order before taking the limit
r → 0. Indeed, ωab is an r × r matrix for integer r, but it is not clear how can we handle it in the limit r → 0.
When we replicated the partition function passing from (43) to (48) we essentially passed from a problem in
which U(xa) is to be maximized to an equivalent problem in which
∑
a U(xa) is to be maximized. The latter
sum is evidently left unchanged by a permutation of the replica indexes 1, . . . , r. Hence it must be expected
that, as long as there is a unique maximum (as in this case), replica permutation symmetry is preserved also
by the solution of Eq.s (62). Then we expect a solution of the form
ω∗ab = Ωδab + ω(1− δab)
ω̂∗ab = Ω̂δab + ω̂(1− δab) (63)
k∗a = k k̂
∗
a = k̂
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This is the so-called replica-symmetric Ansatz, which simply expresses the conservation of the permutation
symmetry. When multiple maxima with different statistical properties exist, this Ansatz fails because replicas
can converge to maxima with different properties, and hence replicas are no more equivalent. This situation is
ruled out in our case by the nature of the function we want to maximize.
With Eq.s (63), it is easy to find an analytic expression of the function g1, g2 and g3 in terms of r and to
perform the limit r → 0. Substituting (63) into the definitions of g1, g2 and g3, after some straightforward
algebraic manipulations one finds
lim
r→0
1
r
g1 = −1
2
(
Ω̂Ω− ω̂ω
)
− k̂k (64)
lim
r→0
1
r
g2 =
〈
log
∫ ∞
0
ds eβV (s;t)
〉
t
(65)
lim
r→0
1
r
g3 =
1
n
〈
log
∫ ∞
0
dx eβW (x;t,x0)
〉
t,x0
(66)
where
βW (x; t, x0) ≡ βu(x)−
(
x− x0 +
√
n∆ωt− in∆k
)2
2n∆(Ω− ω) −
1
2
log[2πn∆(Ω− ω)] (67)
βV (s; t) ≡ Ω̂− ω̂
2
s2 +
[
t
( k̂2
∆
+ ω̂
)1/2
+ ik̂
ǫ
∆
]
s (68)
We must finally evaluate the limit β → ∞. In this limit, a somewhat special role is played by the quantity
χ = β(Ω− ω). Notice that
Ω− ω = 1
2N
N∑
i=1
(si,a − si,b)2 (69)
is the distance between two replicas. The two vectors sa and sb both converge to the unique solution of the
maximization problem as β →∞. Hence, we also expect the distance Ω−ω to vanish in this limit. But looking
e.g. at W/β one realizes that in order to avoid annoying divergences or trivial limits this quantity must vanish
in such a way that the product β(Ω− ω) stays finite. In other terms, one wants that Ω− ω ∼ 1/β for large β.
If this is the case, the maximization problem has a well-defined solution. Hence we assume that limβ→∞ χ is
finite. Similar arguments lead to the introduction of the following re-defined order parameters, which remain
finite as β →∞:
χ = n∆β(Ω− ω), χ̂ = − Ω̂− ω̂
β
, κ = −in∆k (70)
κ̂ = i
k̂
∆β
, γ̂ = β−2ω̂ (71)
Inserting these in the previous expressions we find that the r.h.s. of (61) (which we for simplicity denote again
by h) can be written as
h(Ω, κ, κ̂, γ̂, χ, χ̂) =
1
2
(
Ωχ̂− γ̂χ
n∆
)
− 1
n
κ̂κ+
1
β
〈
log
∫ ∞
0
ds eβV (s;t)
〉
t
+
1
nβ
〈
log
∫ ∞
0
dx eβW (x;t,x0)
〉
t,x0
(72)
where now the functions V and W read
W (x; t, x0) = u(x)−
(
x− x0 + κ+
√
n∆Ωt
)2
2χ
(73)
V (s; t) = − χ̂
2
s2 +
(
t
√
γ̂ −∆κ̂2 + κ̂ǫ)s (74)
We neglected the last term in W because it is vanishingly small in the limit β →∞ when χ is finite.
When β →∞, again by steepest descent reasoning, only the maxima of V and W contribute to the integrals
over s and x. Therefore we can write the final expression for h as
h(Ω, κ, κ̂, γ̂, χ, χ̂) =
〈
max
s≥0
[
− χ̂
2
s2 +
(
t
√
γ̂ −∆κ̂2 + κ̂ǫ)s]〉
t
+
1
2
(
Ωχ̂− γ̂χ
n∆
)
− 1
n
κ̂κ+
+
1
n
〈
max
x≥0
[
u(x)−
(
x− x0 + κ+
√
n∆Ωt
)2
2χ
]〉
t,x0
(75)
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The difference between this expression and the one appearing in (14) is again a trivial redefinition of the order
parameters. If we let now x∗(t, x0) and s
∗(t) be the values maximizing the functions W and V , respectively,
and therefore given by (15) and (17), we can then expand (75) to obtain
h(Ω, κ, κ̂, γ̂, χ, χ̂) = − χ̂
2
〈
(s∗)2
〉
t
+
√
γ̂ −∆κ̂2 〈ts∗〉t + κ̂ǫ 〈s∗〉t +
1
2
(
Ωχ̂− γ̂χ
n∆
)
− 1
n
κ̂κ+
+
1
n
〈u(x∗)〉t,x0 −
1
2nχ
〈(
x∗ − x0 + κ+
√
n∆Ωt
)2〉
t,x0
(76)
The last step is to derive the saddle-point equations from which the values that the order parameters take on
at equilibrium can be calculated. Computing the derivatives of h with respect to the order parameters we get
∂h
∂Ω
=
1
2
χ̂− 1
2χ
√
∆
nΩ
〈(
x∗ − x0 + κ+
√
n∆Ωt
)
t
〉
t,x0
(77)
∂h
∂κ
= − 1
n
κ̂− 1
nχ
〈
x∗ − x0 + κ+
√
n∆Ωt
〉
t,x0
(78)
∂h
∂κ̂
=
−∆κ̂√
γ̂ −∆κ̂2
〈ts∗〉t + ǫ 〈s∗〉t −
1
n
κ (79)
∂h
∂γ̂
=
1
2
√
γ̂ −∆κ̂2 〈ts
∗〉t −
χ
2n∆
(80)
∂h
∂χ
= − γ̂
2n∆
+
1
2nχ2
〈(
x∗ − x0 + κ+
√
n∆Ωt
)2〉
t,x0
(81)
∂h
∂χ̂
= −1
2
〈
(s∗)2
〉
t
+
1
2
Ω (82)
Using the relation (17) and setting p = −κ̂, σ =
√
γ̂ −∆κ̂2 we finally arrive at Eq.s (19–24).
C The p.d.f.’s of s and x
We illustrate here the procedure for calculating the conditional probability density of x (the equilibrium con-
sumption) given x0 (the initial endowment). The derivation of the distribution of s follows exactly the same
lines. One can start from the identity
P (x|x0) =
∫ ∞
−∞
dt√
2π
e−t
2/2δ[x− x∗(t, x0)] (83)
Then one can make use of the property δ(x − x∗) = |f ′(x∗)|δ[f(x)], where f(x) is a function with an unique
root in x∗. From (17), we take
f(x) =
x− x0 − χu′(x) + k√
n∆Ω
+ t (84)
so that
P (x|x0) =
∫ ∞
−∞
dt√
2π
e−t
2/2 1− χu′′(x)√
n∆Ω
δ
[
t+
x− x0 − χu′(x) + k√
n∆Ω
]
(85)
From this, taking the integral over t, one immediately finds (18).
D Calculation of h at the saddle point and derivation of Walras’ law
Substituting s with s∗(t) (15) and x with x∗(t, x0) (17) we can re-write h as
h = σ 〈s∗t〉t − ǫ 〈s∗〉t p−
1
2
χˆ
〈
(s∗)2
〉
t
+
1
2
χˆΩ+
kp
n
− χσ
2
2n∆
− χp
2
2n
+
+
1
n
〈u(x∗)〉t,x0 −
1
2nχ
〈
(x∗ − x0 + k +
√
n∆Ωt)2
〉
t,x0
(86)
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Now it’s a simple algebraic problem. For the first term on the r.h.s. we use (23); for the second and the fifth
we use (24); the third and fourth cancel because of (22); finally for the last term we use (17) and then (21) to
find, finally,
1
2nχ
〈
(x∗ − x0 + k +
√
n∆Ωt)2
〉
t,x0
=
χ
2n
〈
(u′(x∗))
2
〉
t,x0
=
χ
2n
(
σ2
∆
− p2
)
(87)
(25) follows immediately.
In order to derive Walras’ law, we note that when computing 〈s∗t〉t, one can make the substitution t =
(χˆs∗ + ǫp)/σ (which is only valid when s∗ > 0). Then (23) becomes
χ =
∆
σ2
(nχˆΩ + ǫn 〈s∗〉t p) =
∆
σ2
(
nχˆΩ− p2χ+ kp) (88)
where we have used (24) in the last equality. Likewise, we can substitute t in the average of (20) by solving
(17) for t. This yields
nχˆΩ = χ
〈
(u′(x∗))
2
〉
t,x0
− kp− 〈u′(x∗)(x − x0)〉t,x0 (89)
which can be substituted back in (88). This yields the desired result (27).
E Almost uniform initial endowments
In this section we study the limiting behavior of the economy when the spread of initial endowments is van-
ishingly small. In particular we show that when the initial distribution of endowments becomes uniform the
volume of productive activity vanishes. We take ∆ = 1 for simplicity. We take x0 = x0 + δx0, with x0 a fixed
value and δx0 a small random variable, and discuss the solution to the leading order in
〈
δx2
〉
. Then, taking
x∗ = x0 + δx
∗ we can write, to leading order in δx0 and δx
∗
χu′(x∗) ∼= χu′(x0) + χu′′(x0)δx∗ ∼= x∗ − x0 + k +
√
nΩt = δx∗ − δx0 + κ+
√
nΩt (90)
From here we can identity the zero and first order terms in δx∗, viz.
κ = χu′(x0), δx
∗ =
δx0 −
√
nΩt
1− χu′′(x0) (91)
Then from Eq. (20) we get
χ̂ =
−u′′(x0)
1− χu′′(x0) (92)
and from Eq. (21)
σ2 =
[
u′′(x0)
1− χu′′(x0)
]2 [〈
(δx0)
2
〉
x0
+ nΩ
]
= χ̂2
[〈
(δx0)
2
〉
x0
+ nΩ
]
(93)
Coming to the equations for Ω and χ we observe that s∗(t) = s0(t− τ)Θ(t− τ) where
s0 =
σ
χ̂ =
√
〈δx20〉x0 + nΩ (94)
τ = ǫpσ =
ǫp
χ̂
1√
〈δx20〉x0+nΩ
(95)
Then we can write Ω = s20I(τ) with I(τ) =
〈
(t− τ)2Θ(t− τ)〉
t
, which can be solved for Ω
Ω =
〈
δx20
〉
x0
I(τ)
1− nI(τ) (96)
Careful asymptotic analysis implies that in the limit of vanishing fluctuations
〈
δx20
〉→ 0 of the initial endowment
τ diverges as
τ = − ǫu
′(x0)
u′′(x0) 〈δx20〉1/2x0
(97)
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Using asymptotic expansion for I(τ) one finds that the leading order behavior of Ω is
Ω ∼= 1√
2π
|u′′(x0)|
ǫu′(x0)
〈
(δx0)
2
〉3/2
x0
e
−
ǫ2[u′(x0)]
2
2[u′′(x0)]
2〈(δx0)2〉x0 . (98)
Analogously for χ we have
χ ∼=
√
2
π
n
ǫu′(x0)
〈
(δx0)
2
〉1/2
x0
e
−
ǫ2[u′(x0)]
2
2[u′′(x0)]
2〈(δx0)2〉x0 . (99)
With these we finally get χˆ ∼= |u′′(x0)| and σ = |u′′(x0)|
√
〈δx20〉x0 . Therefore when the fluctuations of the initial
endowment vanish there is no market activity.
F Limit ǫ→ 0
Setting ǫ = 0 the averages over s∗(t) become trivial and Eq.s (22,23) and (24) are easily evaluated. Progress
with the other equations is possible, for generic u(x) and ρ(x0), close to n = 2. Then we expect that the
consumption vector x is nearly constant. Then, as in the previous case, we assume x∗ = 〈x0〉 + δx∗ with δx∗
small. Then p = u′(〈x0〉) as before. Using the expressions for Ω, χ and κ and expanding Eq. (17) to linear
order as above, we find the expression
δx∗ =
2χˆ
n∆(x0 − 〈x0〉)−
√
2
n∆σt
|u′′|+ 2χˆn∆
(100)
where u′′ = u′′(〈x0〉). This allows us to compute 〈u′(x∗)t〉 ∼= u′′ 〈tδx∗〉 and hence to evaluate Eq. (20):
χˆ ∼= ∆|u′′|
(
1− n
2
)
, n→ 2− (101)
Likewise we can evaluate Eq. (21) and find σ = |u′′|
√
∆(1− n/2). Using these in Eq.s (15,22) we find the
divergence of Ω ∼= 1/(2− n).
This solution breaks down for n > 2. We need to take the limit ǫ → 0 carefully into account. Again we
anticipate that the spread δx∗ will be small. More precisely we assume that σ and χˆ vanish linearly with ǫ and
set s0 = σ/χˆ and σ = dǫ and look for a solution with finite s0 and d. The existence of such a solution justifies
our assumption. Then Ω = s20I(p/d) where I(τ) =
〈
(t− τ)2Θ(t− τ)〉
t
has already been introduced above. The
equation for χ yields χ = n∆s0J(p/d)/(dǫ) where J(τ) =
1
2erfc(τ/
√
2). Expanding Eq. (17),as in the previous
section and using the expressions for Ω and χ just derived, we find
δx∗ = ǫd
(x0 − 〈x0〉)/s0 −
√
n∆I(p/d)t
n∆|U ′′|J(p/d) (102)
which justifies our a priori assumption of small fluctuations. Inserting this and the expressions of Ω in Eq. (20)
for χˆ, after some manipulations, one finds
nJ(p/d)
n
2
erfc
(
p√
2d
)
= 1 (103)
which gives d as a function of n and 〈x0〉. Notice that φ = J(p/d) = 1/n. Furthermore J(τ) ≤ 1/2 for τ ≥ 0
which means that this solution describes the region n ≥ 2. This equation also simplifies the expression of
χ ∼= ∆s0/(dǫ). The equation for σ finally gives
s0 =
√
〈δx20〉
∆[1− nI(p/d)] (104)
Note that Eq. (103) implies that d → ∞ as n → 2+. The leading behavior is d ∼=
√
2
π
pn
2−n . In the same limit
I(p/d) → 1/2 which means that 〈s∗〉 ∝ s0 ∼ 1/(n − 2) also diverges as n → 2+ matching the divergence for
n→ 2−.
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